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These notes comment on Williams’ fundamental essay Notes on Conditional Previsions, written as
a research report in 1975 and published in the present issue. Basic aspects of that work are discussed,
including historical background and relevance to the foundations of probability; examples are sup-
plied to help understanding.
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rule1. Precise previsions and precise conditional previsions
P.M. Williams wrote his Notes on Conditional Previsions [22] in 1975, one year after the
English translation [9] of de Finetti’s book Teoria delle probabilita` was published. We oﬀer
some guidance on the main contributions of Williams’ essay, as a revised version by the
author appears in the present issue (we use the numbering in the new version of the paper).
To better understand Williams’ essay, it is useful to recall some of the innovative ideas
in de Finetti’s work:0888-613X/$ - see front matter  2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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gamble [21]) can be made by selecting a real number P(X) called the prevision of
X. To elicit P(X) it is not necessary to preliminarily assess a probability distribution
on the possible values of X, a distribution function for X or anything else. However,
P(X) must be a coherent evaluation. A coherent P(X) can be interpreted in an ideal-
ized betting scheme as an individual’s fair price for either buying or selling X, that is
the price for which she would accept any random gain G = c(X P(X)), where c is an
arbitrary real value chosen by a competitor (when c is positive, the individual buys X;
when c is negative, she sells it, or buys X). Obviously the bet would not be accept-
able if supG < 0 for some c and a given P(X), because then the individual would lose
money whatever happens. Thus coherence for P(X) requires that supGP 0.
(b) Previsions can be announced on any set D of random quantities (that is, D need not
be a linear space, nor a cone, nor any structured set). Coherence requires that any bet
on any ﬁnite number of random quantities in D is such that the supremum of the
corresponding overall gain is non-negative. That is to say, P is coherent on D if
and only if, for all n 2 N, for X1, . . .Xn 2 D, for real c1, . . .cn, deﬁning
G ¼Pni¼1ciðX i  P ðX iÞÞ, we have supGP 0.
(c) An important feature in this approach is that it must be possible to extend a coherent
prevision on D to any superset D 0 of D, in such a way that the extension is coherent
on D 0. Thus an individual can always extend the set of random quantities under eval-
uation, without necessarily modifying her earlier judgements.
The role of a prevision is similar to that of an expectation. In fact, recall from (a) that
assessing a prevision P(X) for X does not require assessing also a distribution function
F(X) forX; however, when F(X) and hence the expectationE(X) is known, then the prevision
P(X) is uniquely determined and P(X) = E(X) (the correspondence is less immediate with
unbounded random quantities [6]). Not surprisingly then, (coherent) previsions are linear
functionals. Note that de Finetti (and Williams) uses the same symbol for both an event
and its indicator function—the reader must operate himself the distinction in each
case. Thus P(A) denotes the prevision of the indicator function of event A, and it is also
taken as the deﬁnition of the probability of event A. Furthermore, Williams’s usage of the
symbol XjE should be better interpreted as the random quantity X conditional on the event
E.
Let us illustrate some features of de Finetti’s approach to probability with a simple
example (a didactic discussion of de Finetti’s theory in the ﬁnite case can be found in
Ref. [14]).
Example 1. You are in a pub where two people are about to throw darts. For each player,
there are two outcomes: 1 if player hits the bull’s eye; 1 otherwise. Call X1 and X2 the
outcomes for the ﬁrst and the second player, respectively; both are random quantities with
values in A ¼ f1; 1g. You can bet on the outcomes: a transaction on Xi with the jth
person in the pub requires you to give cijP(Xi) dollars to receive cijXi dollars—here cij is
chosen by the jth person and P(Xi) is your prevision (fair price) for Xi. Letting ci :¼
P
jcij,
your net gain is G = c1(X1 P(X1)) + c2(X2 P(X2)). Coherence requires you to assess
previsions such that for no pair (c1,c2), G is negative for all the values that X1 and X2 may
assume inA. For example, P(X2) = 2 is not a coherent assessment, as (c1,c2) = (0,1) leads
to a sure loss: G = X2  2 is negative whatever the outcome X2.
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P(X2) =0.2. De Finetti shows that assessment (P(X1),P(X2)) is coherent when it lies in
the convex hull of B ¼AA (this is the square with vertices A, B, C and D in Fig. 1a).
So your prevision (0.5, 0.2), indicated by point P in the ﬁgure, is coherent.
Consider now transactions on other random quantities, such as X3 = X1  X2. The
coherent values of (X1,X2,X3) are fðx1; x2; x3Þ : ðx1; x2Þ 2 B; x3 ¼ x1  x2g. The possible
values of (P(X1),P(X2),P(X3)) consist of the convex hull of this set, i.e. the polytope with
vertices A, F, C and G in Fig. 1a, where the non-displayed vertical axis represents X3
(hence F is point (1,1,2) and G is point (1,1,2)). When (P(X1),P(X2)) = (0.5,0.2),
the coherent value of P(X3) is precisely 0.7 (this is an example of what de Finetti called the
fundamental theorem of prevision). A simpler argument uses the linearity of previsions:
P(X3) = P(X1  X2) = P(X1)  P(X2) = 0.7. Now consider a non-linear relationship, where
X4 = jX1  X2j. The space of possibilities for (X1,X2,X4) is fðx1; x2; x4Þ : ðx1; x2Þ 2
B; x4 ¼j x1  x2 jg. Its convex hull is the tetrahedron with vertices A, C, F and H in
Fig. 1b, where the non-displayed vertical axis is now X4, and the coordinates of the new
point H are (1,1,2). The intersection of such a set with the vertical line through P is a
segment, whose extremes are (0.5,0.2,0.7) and (0.5,0.2,1.7), representing the set of all
previsions that are coherent with your assessment P. The (coherent) prevision P(X4) is
imprecise, as we are only able to constrain it to the interval [0.7,1.7] rather than to a single
point.
Now suppose you are allowed to buy and sell bets after the ﬁrst player has thrown his
dart. Therefore, you are interested in your previsions conditional on the observation of the
ﬁrst outcome. Let us assume that the ﬁrst player hits the bull’s eye, i.e., let us consider the
event E:¼(X1 = 1). Denote by P(XjE) your fair price for a bet, on a random quantity X,
that is called off unless E = 1. Such a fair price is called the conditional prevision for X
given E. When X is an event, the conditional prevision is called conditional probability, and
it is called probability when further E is the sure event.
De Finetti discussed extensively the above items (a)–(c), and gave a fully positive
answer to (c), in the case of unconditional previsions, proving an extension theorem in
[7] (see also [8], pp. 78–79). The proof employed the Axiom of Choice and was a model
for later extension theorems (among them, for coherent rates of exchange [2], and for pre-
visions for unbounded random quantities [6]). De Finetti was also concerned in [9] with
conditional previsions, but considered only some special cases and did not tackle the
extension problem (c). It is important to understand that even in the special case of con-
ditional probabilities de Finetti was not merely interested in the Kolmogorovian set-up
where conditional probability is deﬁned from unconditional (r–additive) probability. DeFig. 1. Random quantities and sets of coherent previsions in Example 1.
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sure for any event A, P(AjA) = 1 for any A, and P(A \ B) = P(AjB)P(B) for any A and B.
Such measures had been discussed already by Keynes [12] and appeared (later than de
Finetti’s ﬁrst proposals) in various works in diﬀerent research areas [5,10]. Many AI tech-
niques connected to ordinal uncertainty, default reasoning and counterfactual reasoning
can be linked to such measures [1,3,13]. We should note that these ‘‘full’’ conditional mea-
sures do allow one to deﬁne conditional probability P(AjB) even when P(B) is equal to
zero (in fact, the reader will note that Williams discusses the behavior of zero probabilities
on several occasions in his paper). The important point here is that conditional previsions
did not receive a ‘‘coherence-based’’ formal derivation in de Finetti’s own work. Williams
comments extensively on the diﬃculties of de Finetti’s approach in his current Section 5.
These unsolved questions are the starting point for the ﬁrst of Williams’ paper objec-
tives, that is, to give a coherence condition for conditional previsions in a suﬃciently gen-
eral case (this is his condition (A) in Section 3.4) and to prove an extension result for them
(Section 4.3). There are also other remarkable results on conditional previsions in his
essay, like their characterization in Proposition 6. Williams’ solution predates several other
justiﬁcations of ‘‘full’’ conditional measures: coherence-based derivations were to appear
only in 1985 (independently by Holzer [11] and by Regazzini [18]), and related derivations
based on preferences appeared later [4,15].
Williams’ other main objective was that of formalizing a diﬀerent coherence notion,
always in a conditional environment, to generalize conditional previsions to imprecise con-
ditional previsions. Furthermore, he solved fundamental problems in the theory of impre-
cise previsions, as we will see in the next section. However, research about imprecise
evaluations was not very widespread in the seventies. This probably explains why Williams
presented several results on imprecise previsions nearly in passing, as instrumental for his
ﬁrst objective, and why, for instance, most of the ﬁnal Section 5 is devoted to precise rather
than imprecise previsions.
2. Williams’ imprecise previsions
Studies on imprecise probabilities (a general term which includes many uncertainty
models, and imprecise previsions as well) have greatly developed since 1975. A basic ref-
erence is Walley’s book [21], and we assume here some knowledge of the main notions
developed there (in fact, Walley’s work was inﬂuenced by Williams’, as Walley acknowl-
edges in the book’s preface). Note that Williams tends to argue in terms of upper previ-
sions, while Walley favours lower previsions. This is no real problem, since the
conjugacy equality P*(XjE) =P*(XjE) between lower (P*) and upper (P*) conditional
previsions may be assumed.
A noteworthy characteristic of Williams’ essay is that several important concepts are
deﬁned in terms of cones of acceptable, or desirable in the currently prevailing later termi-
nology [21], random quantities. So Williams does not start directly from conditions on
‘‘betting’’ (these are obtained from cones, for example in Proposition 1). Nor Williams
starts from partially ordered preferences, as many authors do—note that a partial ordering
on preferences satisfying some simple conditions leads to a cone of random quantities; sev-
eral relationships between cones and preferences are discussed by Walley [21, Chapter 3].
Perhaps a simple example will clarify the intuitions behind the cones discussed by Wil-
liams. Consider the set X of all random quantities X with two values, X(x1) and X(x2).
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two elements, x1 and x2. Now each element of X is a point in the plane drawn in
Fig. 2; some relevant cones can be seen in the ﬁgure. The cone A contains XP, and its
intersection with X6 is the origin. This corresponds to conditions (C1) and (C2) in Wil-
liams’ essay. We can think of b1 (and likewise b2) as made up of ‘‘marginally’’ acceptable
random quantities: if X 2 b1, increasing (decreasing) X(x1) or X(x2) by any positive
amount would make the resulting random quantity acceptable (not acceptable). We can
also consider A, the cone spanned by b1 and b2; no random quantity in this ‘‘nega-
tive’’ cone can be acceptable; in fact, for X 2 A, we know that X is acceptable. And the
region between A and A contains random quantities that are neither acceptable nor
unacceptable. (As a technical aside, the polar cone of A intersects the interval from
(0,1) to (1,0); this intersection deﬁnes an interval of probability measures with vertices
p1 and p2.)
Let us now see in more detail the basic results achieved by Williams. The coherence con-
dition for conditional upper previsions proposed by Williams is condition (A*) in Section
3.1. This condition will be referred to as W-coherence. Unlike de Finetti, he discussed ﬁrst
some simple desirability conditions ((C1 0) and (C2 0) in Section 3.1), and then proved that
condition (A*) holds if and only if the above desirability conditions hold (Section 3). This
approach leads to an extension theorem for upper previsions (Theorem 1, Section 4) with-
out making use of the Axiom of Choice, thus departing from de Finetti’s classical proof. It
is very interesting to note that the upper prevision P* appearing in Theorem 1 is a notable
case of natural extension (using terminology later introduced by Walley). Therefore, Wil-
liams operated a change of perspective in the proof of extension problems, not proving
that a generic extension exists, but ﬁnding the least-committal one, i.e., the natural exten-
sion. This technique and the concept of natural extension were greatly emphasized later by
Walley [21].
Another very important result is Theorem 2, in Section 4.2, which is an envelope theo-
rem in current terminology. It states that an upper conditional prevision is W-coherent if
and only if it is the upper envelope of some family of (precise) coherent conditional pre-
visions. The ‘‘only if’’ clause is very useful in theoretical derivations, while the ‘‘if’’ clause
also guarantees coherence of a practical way of assessing indirectly imprecise previsions, as
envelopes of precise previsions.Fig. 2. Cones of random quantities (points p1 and p2 indicated by small circles).
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envelope theorem. These features diﬀerentiate W-coherence from other concepts of coher-
ence for conditional random quantities. For example, consider a form of coherence pro-
posed by Walley [21, Section 7.1.4 (b)]. An imprecise conditional prevision which
satisﬁes this kind of coherence is also W-coherent, but when replacing W-coherence with
it the ‘‘only if’’ clause in the envelope theorem does not always hold, nor is a natural exten-
sion of its kind guaranteed to exist. Because of these advantages, W-coherence has a prom-
inent role in the still open problem of understanding which notion of coherence is more
appropriate in a conditional environment.
There are other results on W-coherent upper (and lower) previsions in Williams’ essay.
Often, they are introduced because they are needed for the proof of Theorem 2, but several
of them are important on themselves. In particular, a special case of property (A4*) was
later investigated under the name of Generalized Bayes Rule [21]. Furthermore, it is not
diﬃcult to prove, using the material in the paper, that the following characterization of
W-coherent conditional upper previsions holds, which is analogue to that of Proposition
6, Section 3.4, concerning precise previsions: if P* is a conditional upper prevision on X,
then W-coherence (i.e., condition (A*)) is equivalent to the set of four conditions (A1*)–
(A4*).
Let us now consider a new example that aims at clarifying some of the concepts dis-
cussed in the present section.
Example 2. Reconsider the set-up of Example 1, assuming that you have little or no
information at all about the players. You ask three people, who are locally regarded as
betting experts, for this kind of information. Each of them indeed provides you with a
(precise) evaluation.
Deﬁning p(x1,x2):¼P((X1 = x1) ^ (X2 = x2)), one can completely describe (X1,X2) when
a probability p:¼(p(1, 1),p(1,1),p(1, 1),p(1,1)) is assessed. The previsions given by
experts 1, 2, 3 are based on their respective probabilities: p1 = (0.2,0.1,0.2, 0.5),
p2 = (0.1,0.2,0.3, 0.4), p3 = (0.3,0.1, 0.3,0.3).
In fact, remember that expectations uniquely determine previsions. Therefore, pk
uniquely determines a coherent (precise) prevision on the linear space XX of all random
quantities X : B! R by setting PkðX Þ :¼
P
ðx1;x2Þ2BX ðx1; x2Þ  pkðx1; x2Þ. We obtain, for
example, P1(X1) = 1 Æ p1(1, 1) 1 Æ p1(1,1) + 1 Æ p1(1, 1) + 1 Æ p1(1,1) = 0.4, and,
analogously, P1(X2) = 0.2, P2(X1) = 0.4, P2(X2) = 0.2, P3(X1) = 0.2, P3(X2) = 0.2.
At this point you have three coherent unconditional previsions on XX. Without any
further assumption, Williams’ envelope theorem (Theorem 2, in Section 4.2) allows you to
build your coherent upper prevision on XX out of them. This is achieved by simply setting
P*(X):¼maxk2{1, 2, 3}Pk(X) for all X. Your coherent lower prevision for X is then
P*(X) = mink2{1, 2, 3}Pk(X), from the conjugacy equality P*(X) =P*(X). Consider, for
instance, X3 = X1  X2 as in Example 1. By the linearity of coherent previsions, we have
P1(X3) = P1(X1)  P1(X2) = 0.2, and, analogously, P2(X3) = 0.2, and P3(X3) = 0.4, from
which P*(X3) = 0.2, and P
*(X3) = 0.4.
It is useful to point out that there is a clear betting interpretation of coherent lower and
upper previsions. P*(X) is the supremum price l
0 for which you accept buying any bet with
net gain c 0(X  l 0), and P*(X) is the inﬁmum price l00 for which you accept selling any bet
with net gain c00(l00  X), where c 0 and c00 are arbitrary non-negative real values chosen by
competitors. For any price between P*(X) and P
*(X) you do not express a preference
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of imprecise previsions that they allow you to express indecision.)
Now consider the event E = (X1 = 1), as in Example 1. You are interested in evaluating
your upper conditional prevision P*(X2jE). To this extent, you can use Bayes rule to
update each expert’s beliefs given E, obtaining the following three probabilities:
P1(X2 = 1jE) = 0.2/0.7, P2(X2 = 1jE) = 0.3/0.7, P3(X2 = 1jE) = 0.3/0.6, and, conse-
quently, the three coherent conditional previsions P1(X2jE) ’ 0.57, P2(X2jE) ’ 0.86, and
P3(X2jE) = 1 (note that by property (A2*) in Williams’ paper, you also know the experts’
previsions on aX2jE, for any real a). Using Williams’ envelope theorem to take their upper
envelope you then obtain the coherent upper prevision: P*(X2jE) = 1.
Lastly, return to the beginning of the example and suppose the story takes another
direction: you realize that you can bet on D 0 = {X1,X2,X2jE}, and the experts only supply
you with their own precise previsions on D 0, without letting you know any further
assessment of theirs (since previsions for random quantities not in D 0 are unnecessary for
your betting purposes). Can you still apply Williams’ envelope theorem? Strictly speaking,
the answer is no, because Williams’ coherence is not even deﬁned on sets like D 0, it requires
some structure properties. For instance X1 2 D 0, X2 2 D 0 should imply X1 + X2 2 D 0. Of
course, there is (more than) one way-out. The matter will be discussed in the next section.3. Beyond Williams’ coherence?
When considering W-coherence (condition (A*)), one might wonder: does it correspond
to bullet (b) in our Section 1? In other words, does it apply to arbitrary sets of conditional
random quantities? Strictly speaking, the answer is no, because the quantities XjE in (A*)
are such that the events E are (non-impossible and) essentially arbitrary (their correspond-
ing indicator functions must belong to an arbitrarily large linear space), but for each E,
P*(XjE) is assigned for any X in a linear space XE (Section 3.1). In Example 2 for instance,
D 0 should be ‘‘fatter,’’ including in particular also XX. However a W-coherence deﬁnition
without any constraint on each X and E can be introduced, and was employed, for
instance, in [20]. It is suﬃcient for its consistency to note that this version of W-coherence
allows for coherent extensions on any superset, and hence also on supersets satisfying the
conditions of (A*) (this can be proved following the scheme of de Finetti’s extension the-
orem, or also adapting results and proofs concerning the convex natural extension in [16],
Section 5). Therefore, W-coherence can be slightly generalized to a nimbler, structure-free
version, which in the unconditional case reduces to the coherence condition in [21], Section
2.5.4 (a).
An interesting question is: are there consistency notions more general than W-coher-
ence, that substantially preserve essential properties of W-coherence, like the envelope the-
orem or the Generalized Bayes Rule? This problem was investigated in [16,17], where
(centered) convex conditional previsions were introduced. It turns out that (Williams’)
Generalized Bayes Rule holds for this kind of conditional previsions too, while envelope
theorems can be stated in some special cases, but in the general case no simple analogue of
Williams’ envelope theorem could so far be found. Although convex previsions turn out to
be useful for various kinds of problems, including applications to risk measurement, W-
coherence seems to be rather close to the most general consistency notion for which char-
acterizations via envelope theorems are easily applicable.
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tional random quantities that are not necessarily bounded. This area has been investigated
only very recently; some early results can be found in [19].
Finally, although Williams’ contribution oﬀers solutions to many questions about con-
ditional imprecise previsions, there are several other open problems. To the best of our
knowledge, the one raised in the 1975 report and now forming Section 4.2.1 is still among
them.
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